

The Types of Japanese Nationalism and Authoritarian/Democratic Attitudes

A Quantitative Analysis of the Relationship Between Nationalism and Democracy

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to reveal the relationship between several types of nationalism and authoritarian/democratic attitudes in recent Japan. Japan is a typical ethnic nation, but the number of foreign residents increase steadily, and it doubled in recent 20 years. However, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who was often seen as the “revisionist nationalist” regarded them not as “immigrants” but just as “foreign human resources”. Because Abe was also notorious for his hard-line political stance, his opponents called him “the destroyer of Japanese democracy”. Therefore, I inquire about the relationship between types of nationalism and democratic/authoritarian attitudes in recent Japan. I use data collected by nationwide quantitative mail surveys in 2021. The latent class analysis extracts 4 classes that imply types of nationalism in each period. The first class is the “Pro-Western” who show positive feelings toward Americans and Western-European but exclude other foreigners. This class shows the most favorable feeling toward Abe and held the strongest authoritarian attitudes among the 4 classes. The second class is the “Ultra” nationalistic who bear strong nationalistic sentiments in all subordinate concepts, and they also like Abe and are relatively authoritarian. The third one can be called the “Liberal” who thinks civic elements such as self-identification are needed to be conditioned for “truly Japanese” and cherish relatively strong patriotism. But they don’t show xenophobic attitudes towards foreigners from all nations. They have the weakest authoritarian attitudes among the 4 classes, but they are not politically activated like no voting. The “Anti-Patriotic” is a fourth class who has relatively weak patriotic feelings but shows strong xenophobic attitudes toward foreigners, especially Chinese and Koreans. This fourth class shows relatively low authoritarian attitudes and is inactive in political attitudes and behaviors.

1. Introduction

1.1. Nationalism and Democracy

Most modern democracies have constituted the form of a nation-state. If the “demos” is equated with nation, nationalism, an idea or movement that seeks to be congruent a particular cultural community with a political community (Gellner 1983), is inevitably also associated with democracy. For example, the French Revolution's slogan, “What is the Third Estate? Everything” was a declaration of ideology that denied the status quo to privileged classes. In that case, nationalism would be one of the ideologies promoting equality and democratization among people.

In recent years, however, nationalism seems to be an ideology that supports authoritarianism rather than democratic attitudes. For example, even in France, people with strong nationalistic feelings tend to be a supporter of the Far-Right Party which shows strong authoritarianism. Nationalism also is operated as an ideological device to conceal the various disparities within the majority population by emphasizing the identity of the “same nation” and at the same time excluding those who are not “nationals”. Much of the nationalism that has manifested itself with the widening disparities in recent years has been characterized by exclusionism toward people of certain attributes (ethnic, racial, etc.) rather than by a desire for domestic equality. Rather than seeking redistribution to eliminate material and economic disparities, there is widespread support for parties and politicians who push the issue of recognition of major ethnic groups as “nationals” to the forefront. In this regard, Fukuyama (2018) argues that people sometimes seek recognition of dignity, especially at the group level, rather than material and economic interests, and that this is the result of the influence of such “identity politics”.

In contemporary society, then, is nationalism associated with democratic attitudes or is it a driver of authoritarianism? To reveal this point, I analyze a sample of Japan, which is regarded as a typical “ethnic nation,” as a case study.

1. 2. Democracy in the Japanese Nation

Japan has been considered a typical “ethnic nation”. Indeed, there are few countries in the world where the majority ethnic group comprises more than 95% of the population. Nevertheless, the composition of the population is in the process of changing, with the number of foreign nationals having more than doubled in the past 20 years.

However, nationalism, which shows diverse aspects depending on the time and place, is now a subject that can easily be oversimplified. For example, political positions, it is often understood in a simple scheme in which the right defends nationalism while the left denies it. Based on their strong nationalism, the right-wingers exalt the authority of the state, insist on the strengthening of moral and security authority, and pursue a hard line in foreign affairs. On the other hand, those on the left and left-wing view nationalism as a dangerous ideology that leads to militarism, dislike the authority

of the state that glorifies such nationalism and insist that the nation-state itself, the mother of nationalism, should be dismantled. Especially in Japan, the term “nationalism” is often considered synonymous with an assertion affirming Japan before 1945 concerning prewar ultra-nationalism and is a term that is widely evaluated according to one's historical view of Japan before and during World War II. The term is often considered to be synonymous with a claim affirming Japan before 1945.

However, Shinzo Abe, who was the longest-serving prime minister in Japan's history, had never recognized these foreign people long living in Japan as “immigrants,” although he called them “foreign human resources,” while admitting that he is a “nationalist. Meanwhile, some opponents of Abe criticized him as a “destroyer of democracy.

As this symbolic example shows, the association between nationalism and democratic attitudes held by people in contemporary Japanese society can be expected to be inversely proportional. Considering that Shinzo Abe, a world-renowned restorationist nationalist, became the longest-serving prime minister in the history of constitutional government, it is conceivable that nationalism has influenced politics in Japanese society as well. In this paper, I will examine the characteristics of this connection and its social background in Japanese society, while referring to research findings in Europe and the United States, where a certain amount of debate is underway. By doing so, it presents the results of an analysis of the structure of the relationship between nationalism and inequality in today's globalized society, based on a typical case study of an ethno-national state.

2. Previous studies

2.1. Liberal Nationalism in the West vs. Authoritarian Nationalism in the East?

Since Hans Kohn's famous Ethnic-Civic dichotomy (Kohn 1944), the link between types of nationalism and political regimes has been debated. The “civic nation” is considered a typology that seeks a specific territory, legal and institutional community, and common civic culture (Smith 1991). It is primarily classified as the Western nations (e.g., France) that were preceded to constitute a nation-state. The explanation of the process of its creation includes a description of the people's revolution. Explanations of its generative process include many of the elements asserted in discussions of “modernization,” such as the bourgeois revolution, industrialization, and the development of capitalism. Therefore, in the classical understanding since Kohn, civic nationalism, which promotes the equalization of disparities within a nation, is almost equated to “liberal nationalism” (Miller 1995). It has been also considered nationalism in the “West”. The Western European countries and the United States are classical examples of it.

In contrast, the other type named “ethnic nationalism” tends to emphasize common ancestry, language, religion, customs, and traditions among its members. It is also argued that the process of creation of this type of nation emphasizes the use of official nationalism by the elites and the cultural aspect of “common mythology. It is often regarded that ethnic nationalism is easily associated with

authoritarian regimes, as seen in the German and Japanese cases. For a more detailed explanation, nationalism during World War II in Germany is deemed as an authoritarian nationalism, and in Japan is treated as “ultra-nationalism” (Maruyama 1964).

Actual data analysis, however, denies such a simple congruent relationship. For example, Shulman (2002) pointed out that cultural national identity is stronger in Western European countries, which are considered “civic nations,” than in Central and Eastern Europe, which are generally classified as “ethnic nations. Hjerme (2003) compared the strength of nationalist sentiment and national pride in Eastern and Western European countries and found that cultural national pride was associated with xenophobia in many Western European countries. Thus, the empirical examination has yielded results that are rather different from theoretical assumptions, and it can be said that the current situation requires theoretical consideration to sort out and integrate such seemingly contradictory findings.

Rather, the diversity of nationalism within a country is being discussed. Indeed, nationalism has historically become associated with conservatism or traditionalism, and authoritarianism in civic nations like the United States and France. We can cite many examples where nationalism and authoritarianism are easily linked in civic-type nations, as seen in the strong connection between nationalism and authoritarianism shown by Trump supporters in the United States.

Considering the above, the link between nationalism and authoritarian or democratic attitudes in Japan, a typical “ethnic nation,” but also has long been a “democratic state” especially after World War II, could provide a significant empirical evidence for the relationship between nationalism and authoritarianism or democracy.

2.2. Nationalism and Political Attitude

Nationalism and fascism are sometimes considered synonyms, especially in the democratic advanced countries. As the theory of liberal nationalism claims (Miller 1995), however, certain types of nationalism are also said to be a foundation to democracy.

So, how does nationalism relate to political attitudes? No small amount of research exists on the relationships between ethnic or civic nationalism and party support or voting behavior. For example, the link between support for far-right parties and xenophobia has long been studied (Semyonov et al. 2006, etc.) In the Japanese case, Liberal Democratic Party (hereafter called “LDP”) supporters held strong nationalistic attitudes compare to other party supporters or the independents, so their attitudes may be described as right-wing in the traditional sense (Tanabe et al. 2013).

Authoritarianism and its attitudes are one of the top topics in social science from the days of the Nazi regime (Adorno et al 1950) to the present day (Stenner 2005). For example, Adorno and his colleagues (Adorno et al 1950) measured authoritarian personality to understand the mentality of the German people at the time who supported the Nazis. Stenner's argument also continues to be

examined today as a prediction of the emergence of authoritarian leaders such as ex-President Trump. Although authoritarianism is often cited as a psychological trait of supporters of regimes strongly associated with nationalism, surprisingly little analysis has been done on how it is directly related to nationalistic attitudes. This paper, therefore, examines how nationalism and authoritarian attitudes are related in Japan, a country with a historical experience of a “fascist state,” to clarify the structure of association between the two concepts in people's consciousness.

2.3. Nationalism as a cognitive frame

Most of the conventional empirical studies on nationalism have analyzed only one aspect of nationalism, such as the patriotic facet of national pride or the xenophobic factor that regards immigrants as a threat. As a result, discussions tended to focus on only one aspect of the multidimensional existence of nationalism.

But some empirical studies showed that while civic national pride, such as pride in democracy, suppresses xenophobia in many Western countries, on the contrary, it tends to correlate positively with xenophobia in Japan (Tanabe 2010), it has been shown that there are various forms of relationships among sub-concepts of nationalism.

As a perspective for analyzing such association structures and their influences on political attitudes, studies have emerged that consider nationalism as a cognitive frame (Brubaker 2004) and use a method of analyzing its bearers based on a typology of such frames (ex. Bonikowski & DiMaggio 2016). First, by treating nationalism as a cognitive frame, a “perspective on the world,” so to speak (Brubaker 2004), it is possible to view it as a single (cognitive) framework that combines various elements. However, the “combination” is not created by each individual in isolation but is a “cognitive template” that is shared and accessible to a certain extent in society, as it arises embedded in public memory, codes of discursive space, institutional and organizational routines, and so on. Therefore, if we can identify the dissimilarities of nationalism as a cognitive frame that exists in each society, it will be possible to discriminate between the structural commonalities of nationalism and the specificities of each nation.

This perspective of cognitive frameworks also allows us to discuss the diversity of nationalisms and their typologies within a country. For example, the above-mentioned study (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016), which examines the typology in the U.S. as a cognitive framework, empirically demonstrates the nationalism typology among the American people. They used a total of 23 items in the National Identity module of the International Social Survey Programme (hereafter referred to as ISSP), including feelings of affinity with the country, conditions for being a “true nation,” feelings of pride in individual items, and ethnocentric views, for latent class analysis (hereafter referred to as LCA) which can be called factor analysis for categorical variables.

The LCA extracted 4 classes as nationalism types. The first class was named “Ardent” because all

items' responses were strong. It comprises about 24% of the sample and is characterized by the fact that it considers both ethnic and cultural criteria such as "birth" and "religion" and civic and political conditions such as "respect Japanese political institutions and laws" and "self-definition" necessary for items related to setting boundaries between national and non-national, which I have named purism in my book (Tanabe ed. 2013). In contrast, the "Disengaged" class, which is weak in all elements, is the smallest, accounting for just under 20% (17%) of the total. The third class is named "Restrictive" and is particularly restrictive in ethnic and cultural aspects such as "birth" concerning purism as a national criterion, while national pride is generally low, with the largest share at 38%. The last class is the "Creedal," those who could be called a kind of liberal nationalist, whose purism overlaps with the American creed and focuses only on the conditions of civic aspects. The relationship between these classes and their social attitudes (toward immigrants, minorities, and the world) and foreign policy preferences is also clear, and the differences in socio-political attitudes between the creedal class and the "Ardent" or "Restrictive" class are particularly striking, with the creedal class being non-extremist and relatively redistribution-oriented, with strong support for the Democratic Party.

As in Bonikowski (2013, 2017), the high degree of homogeneity of "types" as cognitive frameworks (frames) among developed countries is claimed. He claimed there are strong similarities even in Germany, which is considered an ethnic type in the classical classification of nationalism since Kohn (1944), and civic types like France and the U.S.A.

But is the cognitive frame of nationalism really "universal"? For example, in the ISSP data used in the study by Bonikowski (2013), 17 of the 30 countries used in the analysis are Western European countries (including Oceania), with a majority in 17 countries, and if Eastern Europe and Russia are included, 23 countries, nearly 80%. It is undeniable that such a high percentage of Western European countries, or at least European countries, may be influencing the "commonality" found in the data.

Therefore, as I attempt to do in this paper, I will examine the cognitive frame and its relationship with political attitudes in Japan, a non-Western country with a certain amount of democratic history, which will bring new knowledge to this area.

3. Data and the Measurements of Concepts

3.1. Data

The data used for the analysis in this paper are the latest data from a nationwide mail survey conducted every four years since 2009 "Public Opinion Survey on Internationalization and Citizens' Political Participation 2021," which was done immediately after the 2021 lower house election. The stratified multistage method was used for sampling. All the Japanese municipalities were divided into three strata based on the percentage of foreign residents, and 16 municipalities were selected from each stratum, weighted by their population ratios. We extracted 180 respondents who were

randomly selected from the electoral rolls of each of the selected 48 municipalities. The questionnaires were sent by mail to a total of 8,640 persons. As a result, we received a total of 3,079 responses (37.2% excluding those with unknown addresses, etc.; including responses via the Internet).

3.2. Measurements of Nationalism

As for the term “nationalism,” which already has appeared many times in the previous section, it is a concept that is often used ambiguously, with widely varying definitions from one scholar to another. This conceptual imprecision and ambiguity are one of the remote causes of the confusion of related studies and, by extension, of various political debates (Smith 1991). As a result of such a failure to properly grasp the multidimensional aspects of nationalism and its interconnections, the confusion has probably deepened in part to the extent that the number of related studies has exploded in recent years.

To overcome this confusion, it is necessary to understand the pluralistic nature of nationalism and then clarify each of its sub-concepts and the theoretical linkages among them. As a means to achieve this, a schematic understanding would be a very useful method. Therefore, this paper provides a theoretical arrangement of nationalism, in my previous work (Tanabe 2016).

The conceptual scheme of nationalism used in this paper (Figure 1) is composed of three sub-concepts: “purism”, “patriotism”, and “exclusionism”.




Figure 1 Conceptual Diagram of Nationalism

3.2.1. Two Types of Purism

Purism is a concept that represents a sub-concept of nationalism that idealizes a pure and unified “nation” and distinguishes between nationals and non-nationals on specific conditions (Tanabe ed., 2013). This aspect of national conditions also divides collective identity as “us” and “them/them” according to certain attributes and is theoretically related to the discussion of “social identity theory” (Tajfel & Turner 1979). This concept indicates the boundary setting that separates the inside and outside of nations (“we = nationals/ethnic groups” and “they/their = foreigners/non-nationals”).

In Figure 1, those concepts are represented by the line segment enclosed in a square. A solid line shows ethnic purism which implies difficulties to enter into the inner “we” area because those conditions are attributional, so it is difficult to acquire after birth. On the other hand, a dotted line shows civic purism that signifies the possibility to join “we-ness” by acquiring civic or political conditions as citizenship.

Corresponding to the prominent nation typologies (Kohn 1944, Smith 1991, Brubaker 1992, etc.) of “civic nation” and “ethnic nation,” there are two types of “civic/political purism” and “ethnic/cultural purism”. (Hereafter, the terms “civic purism” and “ethnic purism” will be used as basic terms).

The ethnic criteria have been noted in previous studies to be more likely to be associated with chauvinism (Tanabe ed., 2013). For its measurement, this article uses items from the ISSP survey, and the questions are worded as follows. Some people say that the following are “important”, and some say “not important” for someone to be considered truly Japanese. The question asks about seven items, three of which are used in this paper: “being born in Japan,” “having lived in Japan for most of one’s life,” and “having Japanese ancestors. They are attributional conditions that cannot be changed in an acquired way and are considered appropriate for understanding the element of ethnicity associated with one’s origin. This point is an operationalization of the aspects involved in “social identity,” especially the “myth of mono-ethnic nation (Tanabe 2021b).

On the other hand, regarding civic criteria that consider “self-definition” and “respect Japanese political institutions and laws” as conditions for citizenship, it has been pointed out that these criteria, if taken alone, tend to rather weaken exclusionism (Perhrson et al. 2009). In Japan, however, it is not so distinguished from ethnic criteria (Tanabe ed., 2013), and this paper revisits its relevance to exclusionism. Specifically, this article measures three items: respect for the Japanese political system and laws, considering oneself Japanese, and having Japanese nationality.

3.2.2. Measurements of Japanese-type Patriotic Attitude

Figure 1 divides patriotism into “patriotic attitude” and two types of national pride. First, “patriotic attitude” (or “patriotism” in the narrow sense) is a positive feeling or awareness of the Nation in general, which seems to encompass both civic/political criteria and ethnic/cultural criteria.

It is this patriotism that many who are positive about nationalism address and argue for its necessity, including B. Anderson, who in his famous book “Imagined Communities” wrote: “it is useful to remind ourselves that nations inspire love, and often profoundly self-sacrificing love” (Anderson 1991:4).

Such patriotism as a spontaneous attachment (what should be called patriotism in the precise sense of the word) is a sentiment that most people in the Nation would have to some extent, for example, due to the simple contact effect (Zajonc 1968). However, nationalism as an ideology is characterized by the fact that it forces such “love” on others as well. For this reason, the “patriotic attitude” discussed in this article refers not to a simple and natural attachment to a nation, but rather to a consciousness that “love of one's nation is necessary” for the sake of integration within a nation.

In fact, in situations where “nationalism is considered strong,” there is also a strong tendency to consider a particular form of love for the Nation as “normal” and to deny other forms. For example, in Japan at the time of World War 2, only the form of patriotism “victory in the Greater East Asia War” was touted as legitimate. Therefore, those who held the patriotic sentiment that “we should quit the war to protect the lives and property of the people” were excluded from the mainstream nationalism of the time as “unpatriotic”.

In this study, “patriotism” as an aspect of nationalism was measured using the following Japanese version of the index below.

Q: What do you think about the following opinions?

- A. It is natural to teach the national flag and anthem in education.
- B. We must review postwar education to teach children more about patriotism and national responsibilities.
- C. I feel proud to be Japanese.

For the above three questions, both A and B were answered in the context of “education. This is based on the historical background that “nationalism” in textbooks and education has been widely discussed in Japan since the 1990s and is a topic that typically causes controversy between the left and right in Japan. More specifically, question B, in particular, includes the idea that “others should also be patriotic” by “teaching patriotism,” and in this respect, it is an indicator of patriotism as a “-ism. On the other hand, the question “feel proud” in C is a personal question about whether or not one feels proud oneself and is closer to what is called “patriotism” in a more general sense.

3.2.3. Measuring “Exclusivism”

Negative feelings and principles toward the “outside” of the Nation are generally named “exclusivism,” and will be discussed as part of nationalism. To separate inside and outside by purism, in other words, is to embrace a particular social identity. That such a particular social identity can lead to hostility and prejudice toward out-groups is often discussed in social identity theory (for an

overview of social identity theory, see Brown 1995=1999 and Chapter 2 of this book). Applied to nationalism, purism can be thought of as the acquisition of the social identity of a “member of the nation” as an internal group, which leads to hostility toward and exclusion of the external group (foreign countries and foreigners) from the nation.

In this study, we measured this “anti-foreignism” using a modified version of items used in the Japanese General Social Surveys and other surveys. Specifically, respondents were asked, “Do you agree or disagree that the following types of people should be added to the community in which you live?” They were then asked whether they agreed or disagreed that the number of Americans, Chinese, Koreans, Japanese Brazilians, Germans, and Filipinos should increase. In this paper, “anti-foreignism” as measured by these questions will be discussed as basically (narrowly) “xenophobia,” following my previous work (Tanabe ed. 2013).

3.2.4. Types of nationalism

To extract typologies of nationalism in Japan, I also use latent class analysis as follows Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016). For simplicity and stability of analysis, purism and exclusionism were merged into two categories, and patriotism into three categories. The classes used in this paper will also be compared with the results of the analysis of data collected using similar methods in 2009, 2013, and 2017 to confirm stability (See Tanabe 2021a for details).

Table1 Class Composition Percentage and Conditional Response Probabilities

		Pro-West	Anti-Pat	Ultra	Liberal
	Composition	0.29	0.19	0.28	0.24
Purism	Birth	0.83	0.28	0.76	0.54
	Nationality	0.99	0.64	0.95	0.81
	Residence	0.85	0.37	0.78	0.62
	Language	0.94	0.49	0.87	0.72
	Respect for Law	0.94	0.66	0.87	0.81
	Self-Identi	0.96	0.65	0.91	0.85
	Ancestry	0.75	0.23	0.71	0.44
Patri	Nat-Flag	0.88	0.63	0.75	0.68
	Patri Edu	0.69	0.38	0.53	0.41
	Pride	0.94	0.69	0.84	0.79
Exclusionism	Americans	0.03	0.13	0.88	0.01
	Chinese	0.97	0.97	1.00	0.15
	Korean	0.87	0.85	1.00	0.01
	Germany	0.12	0.18	0.98	0.00
	Phillipn	0.53	0.58	1.00	0.01
	J-Brazilian	0.35	0.40	0.95	0.00

Let us take a closer look at the classes extracted from the 2021 data sets used in the analysis of this paper. The first class has strong purism and patriotic attitudes, and exclusionism except for Americans and Germany. For that reason, I could be called it the “pro-Western” type. It is also the largest percentage (29%) among the four classes.

The next class has a response probability similar to that of the above-mentioned pro-Western type in terms of exclusivism. However, the response tendencies for purism and patriotism are relatively low. I, therefore, name it the “anti-Patriotic” type. The proportion of the “anti-Patriotic” class is less than 20%.

The third class is more inclined to be exclusionist toward all foreigners and tends to be more inclined to be strong purism and patriotism. I call it the “Ultra” type and its percentage was 28%.

The fourth and final class, in contrast to Class 3, does not express exclusionary opinions toward any foreigners, while the percentage of agreement with such controversial patriotism items as the purification of ancestral and ethnic conditions and patriotism education is low. Therefore, I named this group the “liberal” type. The percentage of “liberal” respondents was 24%, or about one-fourth of the total.

We consider the above four types of nationalism extracted by LCA as the cognitive framework of nationalism in Japanese society and explore the relationship between each cognitive framework and authoritarian and democratic attitudes and behaviors. By doing so, we will clarify the linkage structure between nationalism, authoritarianism, and democracy in “nation-state” Japan in the 21st century.

3.3. Measurements of Authoritarianism and Democratic Attitudes

The authoritarianism used in the analysis in this paper was measured by the following questions, which have been used continuously in prominent social surveys in Japan, such as the SSM (National Survey on Social Stratification and Social Mobility) survey. The question asked, “What do you think about the following opinions? The questions were “One should always show respect to those in authority”, and “People who question the traditional and accepted ways of doing things usually just end up causing trouble”. In this complicated world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on leaders and experts. The three questions are “In this complicated world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on leaders and experts,” “In this complicated world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on leaders and experts,” and “In this complicated world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on leaders and experts. A principal component analysis was conducted using these three items, and the principal component scores were used as an indicator of authoritarian attitudes in this study.

Next, attitudes toward democracy were measured in terms of approval or disapproval of the following two items. The next two attitudes toward democracy were measured as approval or

disapproval of the following two items: “It is important for me to live in a democratic country,” and “In a democracy compromising between different opinions is important” as a democratic attitude that avoids “division. The five-case law is “1. Agree, 2. Relatively Agree, 3. Neither agree nor disagree, 4.

I also compare the degrees of political activation among nationalism types. For that reason, in the last four years, the following six items of political participation (1. Vote in elections, 2. Signing campaigns, 3. Participate in demonstrations, 4. Attend political meetings, 5. Donations/campaigns, 6. Shared or transmitted political information online) over the last four years was calculated. Shared or transmitted political information online) were calculated.

4. Results of Statistical Analysis

4.1. Association between Nationalism and Authoritarian and Democratic Attitudes

Table 2 shows the relationship between authoritarian attitude and the types of nationalism extracted in the previous section. The score of the authoritarian attitude was extracted by the principal component analysis of the three items mentioned precious section.

Table 2 Mean scores of Authoritarianism in each nationalism type

	Mean	Freq	S.E.
Anti-Pat	-0.308	543	0.040
Liberal	-0.152	713	0.038
Pro-West	0.234	821	0.034
Ultra	0.099	812	0.035
All	-0.001	2889	0.019

Comparing the mean scores of the scale, the nationalism type show that the Pro-West type has the highest positive mean value (0.234). The Ultra type is the second (0.099). On the other hand, the Anti-Patriotic type is the most anti-authoritarian (-0.308). The Liberal type is relatively low (-0.152) in authoritarianism.

Table 3 on the next page shows the cross-tabulation between nationalism types and democratic attitudes.

Table 3 Cross-tabulation between nationalism type and democratic attitudes

	It is important for me to live in a democratic country						In a democracy compromising between different opinions is important					
	Agree	Relatively Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Relatively Disagree	Disagree	N	Agree	Relatively Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Relatively Disagree	Disagree	N
Anti-Pat	40.8%	28.3%	26.9%	1.6%	2.3%	554	11.6%	32.8%	40.8%	11.4%	3.4%	552
Liberal	44.4%	34.6%	17.7%	1.8%	1.5%	723	12.3%	37.5%	35.9%	11.7%	2.6%	718
Pro-West	54.3%	32.7%	11.6%	0.8%	0.6%	838	12.9%	38.8%	36.5%	9.8%	2.0%	836
Ultra	46.7%	33.9%	16.8%	1.6%	1.0%	831	12.4%	33.3%	39.8%	11.4%	3.2%	824
All	47.2%	32.7%	17.4%	1.4%	1.3%	2946	12.4%	35.8%	38.1%	11.0%	2.8%	2930

About 80% of the sample think it is important to live in a democratic country, but the proportion is somewhat different among nationalism frames. More than 50% of the Pro-West type respondents answered “Agree,” and together with Relatively Agree, nearly 90% of them thought of its importance. On the other hand, for the Anti-Patriotic type, only 40% of the respondents answered “Agree”, and when combined with “Relatively Agree”, the agreement rate (proportion of “Agree” + “Relatively Agree”) was less than 70%. This disparity shows a very large difference between the two nationalism types. On the contrary, there does not seem to be any particular type of nationalism that correlates with democratic values that would prevent the division of the country.

Many people in Japan believe that “democracy” was brought to Japan by the United States after the defeat in World War II. Therefore, being pro-U.S. (and pro-Western) is easily associated with advocating democracy. This result implies Japan's historical background of more than 70 years ago has influenced the current attitudes toward nationalism and democracy.

Table 4 compares the average counts of political actions experienced over the past four years. First, the overall average value is less than 1, which confirms the fact that very few respondents have experienced other political actions such as signing campaigns, even if they have voted. The table is omitted, but except for the 80% who have voted, only about 10% have signed campaigns, and less than 1% have participated in demonstrations. Other political activities also experienced less than 5%. Other than institutional political participation(voting), the survey confirmed the extremely inactive political participation in Japan.

Table 4 Average Counts of political actions in the last 4 years

	Mean	Freq	S.E.
Anti-Pat	0.918	558	0.025
Liberal	1.064	730	0.030
Pro-West	0.984	855	0.022
Ultra	0.954	847	0.020
All	0.983	2990	0.012

However, among such inactive political participants, only those who embrace a liberal type of nationalism have an average value above 1. Looking specifically at “signing campaigns” (14%) and “donations/campaigns” (5%), etc. The experience rate is high to a certain extent, with 5% having experienced them, compared to about 3% overall. Nevertheless, the overall low level of experience with extra-institutional political participation suggests that the respondents may not be considered “citizens” who are particularly enthusiastic about democratic activities.

The above simple relationship between categories and means naturally includes the effects of age, education, and other attributes of the people included in the categories. Finally, we conducted a general linear model (multiple regression analysis) to confirm whether these attitudes differ by category, even after controlling for basic attributes like age, gender, marital status (currently married or not), occupation (EGP classification), education (in years) and residence city size (12 major cities, more than 0.1 million, less than 0.1 million). The results are shown in Table 5 below.

Table 5 General Liner Model on Authoritarianism Score

	B	Robust SE	P-value	95% CI	
				Lower	Upper
Intercept	0.622	0.213	0.004	0.204	1.04
Liberal	-0.215	0.059	<.001	-0.331	-0.099
Anti-Pat	-0.432	0.061	<.001	-0.552	-0.312
Pro-West	0.131	0.055	0.017	0.023	0.239
Ref=Ultra					
age	0.000	0.002	0.816	-0.003	0.004
Edu Year	-0.046	0.011	<.001	-0.068	-0.024
Married	0.142	0.059	0.015	0.028	0.257
Higher service	0.064	0.090	0.479	-0.113	0.24
Lower service	-0.059	0.076	0.438	-0.207	0.09
Routine clerical sales	-0.042	0.073	0.563	-0.185	0.101
Small employer	0.053	0.085	0.534	-0.114	0.22
Independent+Farmer	-0.073	0.161	0.648	-0.389	0.242
Manual foreman+Skilled	0.016	0.088	0.853	-0.157	0.189
Semi-UnSkiled	0.066	0.072	0.356	-0.075	0.207
Students	0.133	0.148	0.370	-0.158	0.423
unemployed	-0.063	0.127	0.619	-0.311	0.185
Ref+no job					
12 major cities	0.032	0.051	0.525	-0.068	0.133
Over 0.1 M	0.076	0.051	0.135	-0.024	0.176
Ref=Less 0.1 M					

The result of the general linear model analysis in Table 5 shows us that nationalism types have relatively strong correlations with authoritarianism even when the basic attributions are controlled. Compared to the Ultra-type, the anti-Patriotic type is the most anti-authoritarian. The Liberal type is

also more anti-authoritarian than the Ultra-type, although the estimates are smaller by comparison. The Pro-West types, on the other hand, tend to be more strongly authoritarian than the Ultra types (significant at the 5% level).

Table 6 Poisson Regression Model on Counts of Political Activities

	B	SE	95% CI		P-value	Exp(B)
			Lower	Upper		
Intercept	-0.706	0.212	-1.121	-0.290	0.001	0.494
Liberal	0.146	0.059	0.031	0.261	0.013	1.157
Anti-Pat	0.043	0.057	-0.069	0.154	0.455	1.043
Pro-West	-0.024	0.066	-0.153	0.105	0.713	0.976
Ref=Ultra						1.000
age	0.007	0.002	0.004	0.011	0.000	1.007
Edu Year	0.021	0.011	-0.001	0.043	0.064	1.021
Married	-0.077	0.060	-0.195	0.041	0.202	0.926
Higher service	0.077	0.090	-0.100	0.254	0.395	1.080
Lower service	0.043	0.078	-0.111	0.196	0.587	1.043
Routine clerical sales	0.094	0.075	-0.053	0.240	0.210	1.098
Small employer	0.010	0.089	-0.166	0.185	0.915	1.010
Independent+Farmer	0.053	0.140	-0.221	0.328	0.704	1.055
Manual foreman+Skilled	0.001	0.095	-0.185	0.187	0.991	1.001
Semi-UnSkilled	-0.024	0.074	-0.170	0.122	0.748	0.976
Students	-0.234	0.173	-0.573	0.105	0.176	0.791
unemployed	0.057	0.122	-0.183	0.296	0.643	1.058
Ref+no job						1.000
12 major cities	-0.038	0.052	-0.140	0.065	0.470	0.963
Over 0.1 M	-0.073	0.053	-0.177	0.030	0.166	0.929
Ref=Less 0.1 M						1.000

Table 6 shows the result of the Poisson Regression on count numbers of Political Activities. It indicates that the Liberal type is more active than the Ultra type in political actions even when the basic attributions such as education and age etc. are statistically controlled. The difference between the Liberal type and the Ultra type is just 0.149 as a point estimate and the disparity between the Liberal and the Pro-West is not statistically significant. Therefore, liberal nationalism in Japan has politically activated citizens to a certain degree, but its power seems to be limited to some extent.

4. Conclusions and Future Issues

The analysis in this paper gets three findings. The first is that, given the pluralism and diversity of nationalism, there is a relatively strong link between the authoritarian attitudes and nationalism frame in Japan. The second finding is that as expected the Liberal type has lower authoritarianism, but their supporting attitudes toward democracy are not so strong. On the contrary, the Pro-Western

type thinks “it is important to live in a democratic country,” but at the same time, their authoritarian attitudes are the strongest among the four nationalism types.

Because the Pro-Western type constituted the largest percentage of the population and strongly support the LDP government (Tanabe 2023), the continued linkage between this type of nationalism and a preference for democracy (in the sense of anti-communism) or authoritarian attitude can be considered as an indirect cause of the fact the LDP has dominated power for most of postwar Japan. The Ultra-type who has also strong authoritarian attitudes also supports the LDP, therefore, the pro-authoritarian LDP government has continued to be supported by the combination of those two nationalisms.

On the other hand, the Liberal types doesn’t tend to have strong party support, even though they are somewhat active in political activities outside the system. The anti-Patriotic types are politically inert, to begin with. The inactive political attitudes and actions of those nationalism types which usually hold “anti-LDP” sentiments may also be one of the reasons for long-term LDP governments.

This kind of political situation also influences on Japanese government’s reluctant attitudes to accept immigrants and the absence of a formal immigration policy even though the rapidly declining birthrate and aging population as well as the rapidly growing foreign-born population.

There are many problems to be solved in this paper. For example, one issue is the need to examine “democratic attitudes” in a more multifaceted manner and based on theoretical assumptions. Measurements of authoritarianism are also problematic in that is just based on Japanese local studies, but not based on studies reviewed globally like Stenner (2005) and others. Nevertheless, I believe that this result is interesting enough to show the relationship between nationalism, authoritarianism, and democratic attitudes in Japan, a typical ethnic nation with a rapidly growing immigrant population. It also confirms the influence of nationalism on the political situation and policymaking that cannot be ignored.

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Note

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